The Law of Group Polarization by Sunstein, Cass Robert
 
The Law of Group Polarization
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization (John M. Olin
Program in L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 91, 1999).
Published Version http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics/542/
Accessed February 16, 2015 1:35:50 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13030952
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAAUniversity of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
1999
The Law of Group Polarization
Cass R. Sunstein
Follow this and additional works at:http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of theLaw Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contactunbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cass R. Sunstein, "The Law of Group Polarization" (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 91, 1999).This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
The Chicago Working Paper Series Index:
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Publications/Working/index.html
The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=199668
CHICAGO
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 91
(2D SERIES)
The Law of Group Polarization
Cass R. Sunstein
THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOPreliminary draft 12/7/99
All rights reserved




In a striking empirical regularity, deliberation tends to move groups, and the individuals who
compose them, toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by their own
predeliberation judgments. For example, people who are opposed to the minimum wage are
likely, after talking to each other, to be still more opposed; people who tend to support gun
control are likely, after discussion, to support gun control with considerable enthusiasm; people
who believe that global warming is a serious problem are likely, after discussion, to insist on
severe measures to prevent global warming.  This general phenomenon -- group polarization --
has many implications for economic, political, and legal institutions. It helps to explain
extremism, “radicalization,” cultural shifts, and the behavior of political parties and religious
organizations; it is closely connected to current concerns about the consequences of the Internet;
it also helps account for feuds, ethnic antagonism, and tribalism. Group polarization bears on the
conduct of government institutions, including juries, legislatures, courts, and regulatory
commissions. There are interesting relationships between group polarization and social cascades,
both informational and reputational. Normative implications are discussed, with special attention
to political and legal institutions.
“The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in [the legislative] department of
the government . . . often promote deliberation and circumspection; and serve to check the
excesses of the majority.”
Alexander Hamilton
1
“In everyday life the exchange of opinion with others checks our partiality and widens
our perspective; we are made to see things form the standpoint of others and the limits of our
vision are brought home to us. . . . The benefits from discussion lie in  the fact that even
representative legislators are limited in knowledge and the ability to reason. No one of them
knows everything the others know, or can make all the same inferences that they can draw in
concert. Discussion is a way of combining information and enlarging the range of arguments.”
John Rawls
2
                                                
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago, Law School and
Department  of Political Science. The author is grateful to Timur Kuran, Andrei Marmor, Eric Posner, and Richard
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1 The Federalist  No. 70, at 426-37 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clnton Rossiter ed. 1961).
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“Each person can share what he or she knows with the others, making the whole at least
equal to the sum of the parts. Unfortunately, this is often not what happens . . . . As polarization
gets underway, the group members become more reluctant to bring up items of information they
have about the subject that might contradict the emerging group consensus. The result is a biased
discussion in which the group has no opportunity to consider all the facts, because the members
are not bringing them up. . . . Each item they contributed would thus reinforce the march toward
group consensus rather than add complications and fuel debate.“
Patricia Wallace
3
Consider the following events:
·  Affirmative action is under attack in the state of Texas. A number of
professors at a particular branch of the University of Texas, inclined to be
supportive of affirmative action, meet to exchange views and to plan further
action, if necessary.  What are these professors likely to think, and to do, after
they talk?
·  After a nationally publicized shooting at a high school, a group of people in
the community, most of them tentatively in favor of greater gun control, come
together to discuss the possibility of imposing new gun control measures.
What, if anything, will happen to individual views as a result of this
discussion?
·  A local group of citizens, all of them Republicans, meet in 1998 to discuss
whether President Clinton should be impeached. Before discussion begins, a
strong majority is leaning in favor of impeachment, but they are not firmly
committed to this view. A minority is entirely undecided. If a group resolution
is required, what is it likely to look like?
·  A jury is deciding on an appropriate punitive damage award in a case of
recklessly negligent behavior by a large company; the behavior resulted in a
serious injury to a small child. Before deliberating as a group, the jurors have
chosen appropriate awards, leading to an average of $1.5 million and a median
of $1 million. As a statistical generalization, how will the jury’s ultimate
award tend to compare to these figures?
·  A group of women are concerned about what they consider to be a mounting
“tyranny of feminism.” They believe that women should be able to make their
own choices, but they also think that men and women are fundamentally
different, and that their differences legitimately lead to different social roles.
The group decides to meet every two weeks to focus on common concerns.
After a year, is it possible to say what its members are likely to think?
·  There is an Internet discussion group, consisting of people concerned about
the behavior of certain activities by Americans apparently associated with
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China. Over half of the participants are fearful that China might be engaged in
spying and that under President Clinton, the Department of Justice has turned
a blind eye, in part because of campaign contributions from Americans whose
loyalties are suspect. In what directions are these Internet discussions likely to
lead?
Every society contains innumerable deliberating groups. Faculties, juries, legislative
bodies, political organizations, regulatory commissions, multimember courts, faculties, student
organizations, religious sects, Internet discussion groups, and others engage in deliberation. A
pervasive question has to do with the likely consequences of the deliberative process. It is a
simple social fact that sometimes people enter discussions with one view and leave with another,
even on political and moral questions.
4 Emphasizing this fact, many recent observers have
embraced the traditional American aspiration to “deliberative democracy,” an ideal that is
designed to combine popular responsiveness with a high degree of reflection and exchange
among people with competing views.
5 But for the most part, the resulting literature has not been
empirically informed.
6 It has not much dealt with the real-world consequences of deliberation,
and with whether any generalizations hold in actual deliberative settings.
The standard view of deliberation is that of Hamilton and Rawls, as stated above. Group
discussion is likely to lead to better outcomes, if only because competing views are stated and
exchanged. Aristotle spoke in similar terms, suggesting that when diverse groups “all come
together . . .  they may surpass – collectively and as a body, although not individually – the
quality of the few best. . . . When there are many who contribute to the process of deliberation,
each can bring his share of goodness and moral prudence; . . . some appreciate one part, some
another, and all together appreciate all.”
7 An important question is whether this view is naïve or
excessively optimistic. Perhaps economic, psychological, and social mechanisms lead
deliberating groups in unexpected and undesirable directions. If so, it would be necessary to
rethink current enthusiasm for deliberation as a social phenomenon, and also to reassess and
perhaps to restructure institutions that are designed as deliberating bodies.
My principal purpose in this Article is to investigate a striking but thus far almost entirely
neglected
8 empirical regularity – that of group polarization -- and to relate this phenomenon to
a number of issues in law and political theory. In brief, group polarization arises when members
of a deliberating group move toward a more extreme point in whatever direction is
                                                
4 Sometimes it may seem that moral and political arguments  are unlikely to have an effect; the evidence discussed
here shows that on this proposition is quite wrong as an empirical matter.
5 See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (1997); Deliberative Democracy (Jon
Elster ed. 1998); Jurgen Habermas, Between Law and Norms (1997).
6 Exceptions include  James Fearon, Deliberation As Discussion, in Deliberative Democracy, supra, at 44; Susan
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are introduced by the participants, not by any  third party. See below for discussion of Fishkin.
7 Aristotle, Politics 123 (E. Barker trans. 1972).
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indicated by the members’ predeliberation  tendency.  “[L]ike polarized molecules, group
members become even more aligned in the direction they were already tending.”
9 Group
polarization is the conventional consequence of group deliberation. Thus, for example, the first
deliberating group is likely to become more firmly committed to affirmative action; the second
group will probably end up favoring gun control quite enthusiastically; any group resolution
from the third group will tend to favor impeachment; the punitive damages jury will likely come
up with an award higher than the median and perhaps higher than the mean as well; the group of
women concerned about feminism is likely to become very conservative indeed on gender
issues; the Internet group is likely to fear something like a conspiracy to cover up the relevant
activities.
10
Two principal mechanisms underlie group polarization. The first points to social
influences on behavior; the second emphasizes limited “argument pools,” and the directions in
which those limited pools lead group members. An understanding of these mechanisms provides
many insights into legal and political issues; it illuminates a great deal, for example, about likely
processes within multimember courts, juries, political parties, and legislatures – not to mention
insulated ethnic groups, extremist organizations, student associations, faculties, workplaces, and
families. At the same time, these mechanisms give little reason for confidence that deliberation is
making things better than worse; in fact they raise some serious questions about deliberation
from the normative point of view.
11 If deliberation simply pushes a group toward a more extreme
point in the direction of its original tendency, do we have any systematic reason to think that
discussion is producing improvements?
As we will see, one of the principal lessons of the group polarization phenomenon is to
cast new light on an old point, to the effect that social homogeneity can be quite damaging to
good deliberation.
12 When people are hearing echoes of their own voices, the consequence may
be far more than support and reinforcement. Another lesson is that particular forms of
homogeneity can be breeding grounds for unjustified extremism, even fanaticism. To work well,
deliberating groups should be appropriately heterogeneous and should contain a plurality of
articulate people with reasonable views – an observation with implications for the design of
regulatory commissions, legislative committees, White House working groups, and even
multimember courts.
13 But there is a conceptual problem here: It is difficult to specify
appropriate heterogeneity, and the appropriate plurality of views, without making some
antecedent judgments about the substantive question at issue. I offer some comments about how
to resolve that problem.
This Article is organized as follows. Part II offers some brief notations on the general
question of social influences on individual judgments, with particular reference to the
                                                
9 See John Turner et al., Rediscovering the Social Group 142 (1987).
10 Compare R. Hightower  and L. Sayeed, The Impact of Computer-Mediated Communication Systems on Biased
Group Discussion, 11 Computers in Human Behavior 33 (1995).
11 I am speaking here of real-world deliberation, not of deliberation accompanied by  preconditions  of the sort that
have been influenced by those thinking of it in ideal terms. See Jurgen Habermas, supra. A particular point to
emphasize here is the need for full information. See id.
12 A classic discussion is John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859).
13 Compare Irving Janis, Groupthink (1972) (coming to the same general conclusion, but without discussing
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phenomenon of social cascades. A central point here is that any particular’s persons deeds and
statements create an informational externality.
14 When a number of people have acted or spoken,
observers who lack much private information are highly likely to follow their lead. Part III offers
a basic account of group polarization, with particular reference to some new data in the legal
context. Part IV discusses the mechanisms that account for group polarization. Part V traces the
implications for a number of issues, involving feuds, ethnic strife, juries, commissions,
multimember courts, legislatures, and deliberation via the Internet. Part VI shows in what sense
group polarization raises doubts about the idea that deliberation is a social good; it traces the
implications of the phenomenon for proper structuring of deliberative institutions. Part VII is a
brief conclusion.
II.  Social Influences and Cascades
A. In General
A great deal of attention has recently been devoted to the topic of social influences on
individual behavior.
15 Because many of these influences are at least roughly analogous to what
happens in group polarization, and because they have some bearing on deliberation as well, it
will be worthwhile to offer some brief notations here.
The simplest point is that  people frequently do what they do because of what they think
(relevant) others do. Thus, for example, teenage girls who see that other teenagers are having
babies are more likely to become pregnant themselves
16; littering and nonlittering behavior
appears to be contagious
17; the same is true of violent crime
18; those who know other people who
are on welfare are more likely to go on welfare themselves
19; the behavior of proximate others
affects the decision whether to recycle
20; a good way to increase the incidence of tax compliance
is to inform people of high levels of voluntary tax compliance
21; and students are less likely to
engage in binge drinking if they think that most of their fellow students do not engage in binge
drinking, so much so that disclosure of this fact is one of the few successful methods of reducing
binge drinking on college campuses.
22
                                                
14 See Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, Miracle on Sixth Avenue: Information Externalities and Search, 108 Econ. J.
60 (1998).
15 See, e.g., Dan Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, Va L Rev. (1998). For extended
overviews., see Eliott Aronson, The Social Animal (7
th ed. 1995); Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett, The Person and the
Situation (1991); group polarization is a surprising omission from both of these lengthy and highly  illuminating
treatments.
16 See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, Janet L. Yellen & Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in
the United States, 111 Q.J. Econ. 277 (1996).
17 See Robert Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce
Littering in Public Places, 58 J Pers. And Soc. Psych 1015 (1990).
18 See Washington Post (December 1999).
19 See Marianne Bertrand, Erzo F.P. Luttmer & Sendhil Millainathan, Network Effects and Welfare Cultures
(unpublished manuscript, Apr. 9, 1998).
20 See Ardith Spence, Wants for Waste (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1999).
21 See Stephen Coleman, The Minnesota Income Tax Compliance Experiment State Tax Results (Minnesota
Department of Revenue, April 1996).
22 See H. Wesley Perkins, College Student Misperceptions of Alcohol and Other Drug Norms Among Peers, in
Designing Alcohol and Other Drug Prevention Programs in Higher Education 177-206 (US Dept.of Educ. ed. 1997);
Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan L Rev  683, 767 (1999).Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics 6
Social influences affect behavior via two different mechanisms.
23 The first is
informational. As noted, what other people do, or say, carries an informational externality;  if
many other people go to a certain movie, or refuse to use drugs, or carry guns, observers are
given a signal about what it makes sense to do. The second mechanism is reputational. Even if
people do not believe that what other people do provides information about what should be done,
they may think that the actions of others provide information about what other people think
should be done. Thus each person’s expressive actions come with a reputational externality.
People care about their reputations, and hence they may do what they think other people think
they should do, whether or not they believe that they should do it. Reputational considerations
may, for example, lead people to obey or not to obey the law, smoke cigarettes, buy certain
cars,
24 drive while drunk, help others, or talk about political issues in a certain way. They exert a
ubiquitous influence on behavior.
25
B. Some Classic Experiments
In the most vivid experiments involving group influences, conducted by Solomon Asch,
individuals were willing to abandon the direct evidence of their own senses.
26 In the relevant
experiments, a certain line was placed on a large white card. The task of the subjects was to
“match” that line by choosing, as identical to it in length, one of three other lines, placed on a
separate large white card. One of the lines on the second white card was in fact identical in
length to the line to be matched to it; the other two were substantially different, with the
differential varying from an inch and three quarters to three quarters of an inch. The subject in
the experiments was one of eight people asked to engage in the matching. But unbeknownst to
the subject, the other people apparently being tested were actually there as part of the
experiments.
Asch’s experiments unfolded in the following way. In the first two rounds, everyone
agreed about the right answer; this seemed to be an extremely dull experiment. But the third
round introduced “an unexpected disturbance,”
27 Other group members made what was
obviously, to the subject and to any reasonable person, a clear error; they matched the line at
issue to one that was obviously longer or shorter. In these circumstances the subject had the
choice of maintaining his independent judgment or instead yielding to the crowd. A large
number of people ended up yielding. In ordinary circumstances subjects erred less than 1 percent
of the time; but in rounds in which group pressure supported the incorrect answer, subjects erred
36.8% of the time.
28 Indeed, in a series of twelve questions, no less than 70% of subjects went
along with the group, and defied the evidence of their own senses, at least once.
                                                
23 See, e.g., Elliott Aronson, supra note, at 22; Lee and Ross, supra note, at 44-45.
24 See Robert Frank, Luxury Fever (1999).
25 Timur Kuran, Public Truth, Private Lies (1998), emphasizes  this point.
26 See the overview  in Solomon Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in Readings About the Social Animal 13
(Elliott Aronson ed. 1995).
27 Id. at 15.
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Several refinements are important here. Susceptibility to group influence was hardly
uniform; some people agreed with the group almost all of the time, whereas others were entirely
independent in their judgments. Significantly, the existence of at least one compatriot, or voice
of sanity, mattered a great deal. When just one other person made an accurate match, errors were
reduced by three-quarters, even if there was a strong majority the other way.
29  By contrast,
varying the size of the majority mattered only up to a number of three, and increases from that
point had little effect. Thus opposition from one person did not increase subjects’ errors at all;
opposition from two people increased error to 13.6%; and opposition from three people increased
error to 31.8%, not substantially different from the level that emerged from further increases in
group size.
Both informational and reputational considerations appear to have led people toward
these errors. Several people said, in private interviews, that their own opinions must have been
wrong. On the other hand, experimenters find greatly reduced error, in the same basic
circumstances as Asch’s experiments, when the subject is asked to give a purely private
answer.
30
Asch concluded that his results raised serious questions about the possibility that “the
social process is polluted” by the “dominance of conformity.”
31 He added, “That we have found
the tendency to conformity in our society so strong that reasonably intelligent and well-meaning
young people are willing to call white black is a matter of concern.”
32 Notably, however, Asch’s
experiments did not involve deliberation, for people were not exchanging reasons; indeed, we
might expect that reason-giving would have severely weakened his results. What reasons could
have been given for incorrect matches? But the existence of substantial numbers of mistakes, as a
result of mere exposure to the incorrect conclusions of others, raises questions about whether and
when deliberation will lead people in the right directions.
C. Cascades
Some of the most interesting recent work on social influence involves the possibility of
informational and reputational “cascades”
33; this  work  has obvious relevance to law and
politics.
34 Indeed, it is possible to interpret Asch’s work as having demonstrated considerable
individual susceptibility to cascade effects. What is striking about such effects is that their ripple-
like nature, or the quality of contagion.   Group polarization is sometimes, but not always, a
product of cascade effects; it will be useful to understand the former against the background of
the latter.
The question explored in the cascades literature is why individuals and
social groups sometimes move quite rapidly in some direction or another. A starting point is that
when individuals lack a great deal of private information (and sometimes even when they have
                                                
29 Id. at 18.
30 See Aronson, supra note, at 23-24.
31 Id. at 21.
32 Id.
33 See Sushil Biikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others, J. Econ. Persp., Summer 1998, at 151
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such information), they tend to rely on information provided by the statements or actions of
others. If A is unaware whether abandoned toxic waste dumps are in fact hazardous, he may be
moved in the direction of fear if B seems to think that fear is justified. If A and B believe that
fear is justified, C may end up thinking so too, at least if she lacks independent information to the
contrary. If A, B, and C believe that abandoned hazardous waste dumps are hazardous, D will
have to have a good deal of confidence to reject their shared conclusion. The result of this
process can be to produce cascade effects, as large groups of people end up believing something
– even if that something is false – simply because other people seem to believe it too. There is a
great deal of experimental evidence of informational cascades, which are easy to induce in the
laboratory
35; real world phenomena also seem to have a great deal to do with cascade effects.
36
Notice here that when a cascade is occurring, large numbers of persons end up with a shared
view, not simply because of social influence, but via a particular process, in which a rivulet ends
up as a flood; this is what makes cascades distinctive.
Though the cascades phenomenon has largely been discussed in connection with factual
judgments, the same processes should be at work for political, legal, and moral questions; we can
easily imagine political, legal, and moral cascades. Suppose, for example, that A believes that
affirmative action is wrong, that B is otherwise in equipoise but shifts upon hearing what A
believes, that C is unwilling to persist in his modest approval of affirmative action when A and B
disagree; it would be a very confident D who would reject the moral judgments of three
(apparently) firmly committed others.  Sometimes people are not entirely sure whether capital
punishment should be imposed, whether the Constitution protects the right to have an abortion,
whether it is wrong to litter or to smoke.  Many people, lacking firm convictions of their own,
may end up believing what (relevant) others seem to believe. Recent changes in social attitudes
toward smoking, recycling, and sexual harassment have a great to do with these effects.
37 The
same process may work for the choice of political candidates, as a fad develops in favor of one
or another – a cascade “up” or “down,” with sensational or ruinous consequences. We can easily
imagine cascade effects in the direction of certain judgments about the appropriate course of
constitutional law; indeed such effects seem to have been at work in the legal culture in the
1960s (with mounting enthusiasm for the Warren Court) and the 1980s (with mounting
skepticism about that Court). It is even possible to imagine cascade effects with respect to
questions of constitutional method (eg, textualism, originalism).
Thus far the discussion has involved purely informational pressures and informational
cascades, where people care about what other people think because they do not know what to
think, and they rely on the opinions of others, to show what it is right to think. But there can be
reputational pressures and reputational cascades as well.
38 Here the basic idea is that people care
about their reputations, and they speak out, or remain silent, or even engage in certain expressive
activity, partly in order to preserve those reputations, even at the price of failing to say what they
really think. Suppose, for example, that A believes that hazardous waste dumps pose a serious
                                                
35 See Lisa Anderson and Charles Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory, 87 Am Econ Rev 847 (1997).
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100 J Polit Econ. 992 (1992); Kuran and Sunstein, supra note.
37 See Spence, supra note; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, in Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and
Social Justice ch. 2 (1997).
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environmental problem; suppose too that B is skeptical. B may keep quiet, or (like some of
Asch’s subjects) even agree with A, simply in order to preserve A’s good opinion. C may see
that A believes that hazardous waste dumps pose a serious problem, and that B seems to agree
with A; C may therefore voice agreement even though privately she is skeptical or ambivalent.
It is easy to see how this kind of thing might happen with in political life with, for example,
politicians expressing their commitment to capital punishment (even if they are privately
skeptical) or their belief in God (even if they are agnostic on the question). Here too the
consequence can be cascade effects – large social movements in one direction or another -- when
a number of people appear to support a certain course of action simply because others (appear to)
do so. What is true for factual beliefs can be true as well for moral, legal, and political
judgments. People might say, for example, that affirmative action violates the Constitution
simply because of perceived reputational sanctions from saying the opposite; they might support
or oppose the death penalty largely in order to avoid the forms of social opprobrium that might
come, in the relevant community, from taking the opposing view.
Are social cascades good or bad? No general answer would make sense. Sometimes
cascades are quite fragile, precisely because people’s commitments are based on little private
information; sometimes cascades are rooted in (and greatly fuel) blunders. Sometimes cascade
effects will eliminate public torpor, by generating concern about serious problems; but
sometimes cascade effects will make people far more worried than they be, or otherwise produce
large-scale distortions in private judgments, public policy, and law. The antislavery movement
had distinctive cascade-like features, as did the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa; so too
with Mao’s Cultural Revolution and the rise of Nazism in Germany.
39 The serious risk with
social cascades, both informational and reputational, is that they can lead to widespead errors,
factual or otherwise. Cascades need not involve deliberation; but related problems infect
processes of group deliberation, as we will now see.
III. How and Why Groups Polarize
A.  The Basic Phenomenon
Group polarization is among the most robust patterns found in deliberating bodies, and it
has been found in many diverse tasks. Polarization is said “to occur when an initial tendency of
individual group members toward a given direction is enhanced [by] group discussion.”
40  The
result is that groups often make more extreme decisions than would the typical or average
individual in the group (where “extreme” is defined internally, by reference to the group’s initial
dispositions). There is a clear relationship between group polarization and cascade effects; as we
will see, the former, like the latter, seems to have a great deal to do with both informational and
reputational influences. A key difference is that cascade effects lead people to fall in line with an
existing tendency, whereas polarization leads them to a more extreme point in the same
direction.
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Notice that group polarization refers not to variance among groups of any kind, but to
what happens within a group discussing a case or problem.
41 Consider some examples of the
basic phenomenon, which has been found in an array of nations.
42  (a) A group of moderately
profeminist women will become more strongly profeminist after discussion.
43 (b) After
discussion, citizens of France become more critical of the United States and its intentions with
respect to economic aid.
44 (c) After discussion, whites predisposed to show racial prejudice offer
more negative responses to the question whether white racism is responsible for conditions faced
by African-Americans in American cities.
45 (d) After discussion, whites predisposed not to show
racial prejudice offer more positive responses to the same question.
46 As statistical regularities, it
should follow, for example, that that those moderately critical of an ongoing war effort will, after
discussion, sharply oppose the war; that a group moderately predisposed to hire a certain job
candidate will, after discussion, support the application with considerable enthusiasm; that
people tending to believe in the inferiority of a certain racial group will be entrenched in this
belief as a result of discussion.
The phenomenon of group polarization has conspicuous importance to the operation of
deliberating bodies of relevance to law and politics, including legislatures, commissions,
multimember courts, and juries. I will return to this point shortly; for now notice a few obvious
possibilities. Members of a political party, or of the principal political parties, may polarize as a
result of internal discussions; party-line voting is sometimes explicable partly on this ground. A
set of judges with similar predilections on a three-judge panel may well produce a more extreme
ruling than any individual member would write if he were judging on his own. Extremist groups
will often become more extreme; as we will soon see, the largest group polarization typically
occurs with individuals already inclined toward extremes. With respect to deliberating juries, a
recent study
47 found significant group polarization with respect to “numerical punishment
ratings” on a bounded numerical scale. For high punishment ratings, groups tended to generate
numbers higher than the median of individual predeliberation judgments; for low punishment
ratings, groups tended to generate numbers lower than the median of individual predeliberation
judgments. This is precisely the pattern that group polarization would predict.
B. Risky Shifts and Cautious Shifts
Group polarization was first found in a series of experiments involving risk-taking
decisions.
48 Before 1961, conventional wisdom had been that as compared with the individuals
who compose it, a group of decision-makers – for example  a committee or board – would be
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likely to favor a compromise and thus to avoid risks. But the relevant experiments, originally
conducted by Stoner, found otherwise; they identified what has become known as the “risky
shift.”
49 Deliberation tended to shift group members in the direction of greater risk-taking; and
deliberating groups, asked to reach a unanimous decision, were generally more risk-inclined –
sometimes far more risk-inclined – than the mean individual member, predeliberation.
In the original experiments, male graduate students of industrial management were asked
a range of questions involving risk: whether someone should choose a safe or risky play in the
last seconds of a football game; whether someone should invest money in a low-return, high-
security stock or instead a high-return, lower security stock; whether someone should choose a
high prestige graduate program in which a number of people fail to graduate or a lower prestige
school where everyone graduates. In one problem, for example, people were asked to say
whether a person now having a secure, lifetime job should take a new job, with a new company
with an uncertain future. People were asked about the lowest probability of “financial
soundness” that would justify the person with the secure job from taking the new position. In
Stoner’s studies, people first studied the problems – twelve total – and recorded an initial
judgment; they were then asked to reach a unanimous decision as a group. People were finally
asked to state their private judgments after the group judgment had been made; they were
informed that it was acceptable for the private judgment to differ from the group judgment.
For twelve of the thirteen groups, the group decisions showed a repeated pattern toward
greater risk-taking -- that is, after discussion, the unanimous outcome tended to assess the
necessary likelihood of financial soundness as consistently lower than the median judgment of
the group predeliberation. In addition, there was a clear shift toward greater risk-taking in private
opinions as well. Only 16% were moved toward greater caution; 45% did not change at all; and a
full 39% moved in the direction of greater risk-taking. This shift – the “risky” shift – was
promptly duplicated in a number of diverse studies, some involving all men and some involving
all women.
We should distinguish at this point between two aspects of these findings, not always
separated in the psychological literature and both of relevance to law and policy. The first
involves the movement of deliberating groups, for whom a group decision is necessary, toward
the group’s extreme end; call this (inelegantly) group polarization toward within-group extremes.
This means that if a group decision is required, the group will tend toward an extreme point,
given the original distribution of individual views. Undoubtedly the group’s decision rule will
matter here; a requirement of unanimity may well, for example, produce a shift toward the most
extreme points, at least if those with the most extreme views are least tractable and most
confident. The second involves the movement of (even private) individual judgments as a result
of group influence; call this individual polarization toward within-group extremes. This means
that to the extent that private judgments are moved by discussion, it will be toward a more
extreme point in the direction set by the original distribution of views.
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A possible (and contemporaneous) reading of Stoner’s early studies would be that group
dynamics are such as to move people – both groups and individuals within them -- in the
direction of greater risk-taking. But this conclusion would be much too simple. Later studies
showed that under certain conditions, it was possible, even easy to induce a “cautious shift” as
well.  Indeed, certain problems reliably produced cautious shifts. The principal examples
involved the decision whether to marry and the decision whether to board a plane despite severe
abdominal pain possibly requiring medical attention. In these cases, deliberating groups moved
toward caution, as did the members who composed them.
As yet there is no simple account of what kinds of problems will produce what kinds of
shifts; but the identification of risky and cautious shifts has helped produce a general account of
how much, and in what direction, people will tend to move. In Stoner’s original data, subsequent
researchers noticed, the largest risky shifts could be found when group members “had a quite
extreme risky initial position,” in the sense that the predeliberation votes were weighted toward
the risky end, whereas the items “that shifted a little or not at all started out near the middle of
the scale.”
50  Thus the direction of the shift seemed to turn on the location of the original
disposition, and the size of the shift depended on the extremeness of that original disposition. A
group of very cautious individuals would produce a significant shift toward greater caution; a
group of individuals inclined toward risk-taking would produce a significant shift toward greater
risk-taking; and groups of individuals in the middle would produce smaller shifts in the direction
indicated by their original disposition.  In short, ”group discussion moves decisions to more
extreme points in the direction of the original inclination . . . , which means shift to either risk or
caution in the direction of the original disposition, and the size of the shift increases with the
degree of the initial polarization.”
51  Similar results have been found in many contexts, involving,
for example, questions about economic aid, architecture, political leaders, race, feminism, and
judgments of guilt or innocence.
52 Polarization has been found for questions of obscure fact (eg,
how far Sodom on the Dead Sea is below sea level) as well as for evaluative questions, including
political and legal issues




What explains group polarization? It is tempting to think that conformity plays a large
role, and as the Asch experiments suggest, individual judgments have been found to be greatly
influenced by the desire to conform. Perhaps conformity is sometimes at work, but group
polarization is not a matter of conformity; people do not shift to the mean of initial positions. The
relevant movement goes to one or another side. Indeed, this is what defines, and what is most
interesting about, group polarization.
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 There have been two main explanations for group polarization, both of which have been
extensively investigated.
55 Massive support has been found on behalf of both explanations.
56
1. Social comparison. The first, involving social comparison, begins with the claim that
people want to be perceived favorably by other group members, and also to perceive themselves
favorably. Once they hear what others believe, they adjust their positions in the direction of the
dominant position. They may want to signal, for example, that they are not cowardly or cautious,
and hence they will frame their position so that they do not appear such by comparison to other
group members.
57 With respect to risk-taking activity, people want to occupy a certain position in
comparison to others, and before they hear what other people think, they assume that they do in
fact occupy that position. But when they hear what other people think, they find, often, that they
occupy a somewhat different position, and they shift accordingly. The result is to press the
group’s position toward one or another extreme, and also to induce shifts in individual members.
The same appears to happen in other contexts. People may wish, for example, not to seem too
enthusiastic, or too restrained in their enthusiasm for, affirmative action, feminism, or an
increase in national defense; hence their views may shift when they see what other group
members think. The result will be both group and individual polarization toward within-group
extremes.
The dynamic behind the social comparison explanation is that most people may want to
take a position of a certain socially preferred sort – in the case of risk-taking, for example, they
may want to be perceived (and to perceive themselves) as moderate risk-takers, and their choice
of position is partly a product of this desire.
58 No one can know what such a position would be
until the positions of others are revealed.
59 Thus individuals move their judgments in order to
preserve their image to others and their image to themselves. A key claim here is that
information alone about the actual positions of others – without discussion -- will produce a shift.
Evidence has confirmed this fact; mere exposure induces a substantial risky shift (though it is
less substantial than what is produced by discussion – about half as large).
60 This effect helps
explain a shift toward caution (the “cautious shift”) as well.
61 While highly suggestive, the “mere
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exposure” finding does not confirm the social influence account; it is possible that the views of
others simply provide an informational signal, quite apart from arguments, and hence that people
move not in order to maintain reputation, but to do what is right. (Recall the discussion of
informational cascades.)
The social influence explanation invokes factors similar to those that underlie  the
reputational cascade. A major difference is that the social influence explanation concerns
presentation to self as well as presentation to others. Note also that group polarization may or
may not be a result of any cascade effect; the question is whether the accumulation of views
from others operates in the form of a cascade. Existing work on group polarization does not
answer this question.
2. Persuasive arguments. The second explanation, emphasizing the role of persuasive
arguments, is based on a common sense intuition: that any individual’s position on an issue is
partly a function of which arguments presented within the group seem convincing. The choice
therefore moves in the direction of the most persuasive position defended by the group, taken as
a collectivity. Because a group whose members are already inclined in a certain direction will
have a disproportionate number of arguments supporting that same direction, the result of
discussion will be to move individuals further in the direction of their initial inclinations. The
key is the existence of a limited argument pool, one that is skewed (speaking purely
descriptively) in a particular direction.
The persuasive arguments theory begins with the suggestion that if a group is deliberating
about some difficult question with a factual answer (how many countries are there in Africa, for
example, or how many people were on the planet in 1900), discussion will typically produce
some movement, not toward the mean, but toward the minority view on which one or a few
members have accurate information. There is, moreover, empirical evidence that with respect to
facts, deliberation produces movements toward accuracy.
62 Of course many of the questions
involving group polarization do not have purely factual answers. But a key aspect of those
discussions is that the person with the correct answer is likely to state his view with a high
degree of confidence, and also be able to make some argument in favor of that view. Novel
arguments, bringing up fresh points, are especially likely to be persuasive. In any case members
of a group will have thought of some, but not all, of the arguments that justify their initial
inclination; consider the question whether to take risks or to be cautious. In discussion,
arguments of a large number of individuals are stated and heard, but the total argument pool will
be tilted in one or another direction, depending on the predispositions of the people who
compose the group; hence there will be a shift in the direction of the original tilt.
63
When people hear arguments that they perceive as valid, or find to be memorable, vivid,
new, or weighty simply by virtue of emphasis and repetition, they will shift in the direction
suggested by those arguments. If a group of moderately feminist women becomes more feminist,
a group moderately opposed to gun control more extremely so, and so forth, one reason is that
the argument pool of any such group will contain a preponderance of arguments in the direction
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suggested. The suggestion is that group polarization will occur when convincing arguments
produce a shift in the direction of prediscussion inclinations, revealed in the means of the initial
decisions
There is an obvious analogy here to the informational cascade. In fact we can safely
assume that group polarization sometimes occurs via a kind of informational cascade, as the
statements of particular people begin a cascade process that culminates in extremism. The
difference is that for cascade effects, what is crucial is the very fact of the belief, not its grounds,
whereas for persuasive arguments to work, what is crucial is that arguments be offered and be
found persuasive. It is also unclear whether any particular group polarization involves cascade
effects at all; undoubtedly what sometimes happens is not a cascade effect, in which a large
number of people successively “fall,” but a simple accumulation of arguments, eventually
imposing weight on people whose views are subject to change.
B. Refinements -- and Depolarization
These are statistical regularities, no more. Of course not all groups polarize; some groups
end up in the middle, not toward either extreme. Note that in Stoner’s original experiments, one
of the twelve deliberating groups showed no polarization at all. Nor is it hard to understand why
this might be so. If the people defending the original tendency are particularly unpersuasive,
group polarization is unlikely to occur. If the outliers are especially convincing, groups may even
shift away from their original tendency and in the direction held by few or even one.
64 In
addition, affective factors appear to be quite important and complementary to persuasive
arguments. People are less likely to shift if the direction advocated is being pushed by unfriendly
group members; the chance of shift is increased when people perceive fellow members as
friendly, likeable, and similar to them.
65 Physical spacing tends to reduce polarization; a sense of
common fate and intragroup similarity tend to increase it, as does the introduction of a rival
“outgroup.”
66 Part of the reason for group polarization appears to be that as a class, extreme
positions tend to be less tractable and more confidently held. This point is an important
complement to the persuasive arguments theory
67: The persuasiveness of arguments depends, not
surprisingly, not simply on the grounds given, but also on the confidence with which they are
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articulated. (Consider here both juries and multimember courts.) Group polarization can also be
fortified through “exit,” as members leave the group because they reject the direction in which
things are heading. If exit is pervasive, the tendency to extremism can be greatly aggravated.
Notably, the persuasive arguments theory implies that there will be “depolarization,” or
convergence toward the middle, if and when new persuasive arguments are offered that are
opposite to the direction initially favored by group members. There is evidence for this
phenomenon as well.
 68 Depolarization, rather than polarization, will also be found when the
relevant group consists of individuals drawn equally from two extremes (a point to which I will
return).
69 Thus if people who initially favor caution are put together with people who initially
favor risk-taking, the group judgment will move toward the middle.
Group members with extreme positions generally change little as a result of discussion or
shift to a more moderate position.
70  Consider a study
71 consisting of six-member groups
specifically designed to contain two subgroups (of three persons each) initially committed to
opposed extremes; the effect of discussion was to produce movement toward the center. One
reason may be the existence of partially shared persuasive arguments in both directions.
72
Interestingly, this study of opposed subgroups found the greatest depolarization with obscure
matters of fact (e.g., the population of the United States in 1900) -- and the least depolarization
with highly visible public questions (e.g., whether capital punishment is justified). Matters of
personal taste depolarized a moderate amount (e.g., preference for basketball or football, or for
colors for painting a room).
73
These findings fit well with the persuasive arguments account of polarization. When
people have a fixed view of some highly salient public issue, they are likely to have heard a wide
range of arguments in various directions, producing a full argument pool, and an additional
discussion is not likely to produce movement. Hence “familiar and long-debated issues do not
depolarize easily.”
74 With respect to such issues, people are simply less likely to shift at all.
It also matters whether people think of themselves, antecedently or otherwise, as part of a
group, with a degree of solidarity. If they think of themselves in this way, group polarization is
all the more likely, and it is likely too to be more extreme.
75 Thus when people are “de-
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individualized,” in the sense that the context emphasizes each person’s membership in the social
group engaging in deliberation, polarization increases.
76
An especially interesting experiment attempted to investigate this point by manipulating
two variables.
77 First, some subjects were “de-individualized” by having to work on computers in
separate rooms, whereas others were asked to work in a single office with desks facing each
others (the “individualized” condition), In the de-individualized condition, visual anonymity was
increased. Second, some subjects were given instructions in which group membership was made
salient (the “group immersion” condition), whereas others were not (the “individual” condition).
For example, subjects in the group immersion conditions were told that their group consisted
solely of first-year psychology students, and that they were being tested as group members rather
than as individuals. All conditions were held constant in one respect: Every subject was told that
people like them tended to support one or another view. The relevant issues involved affirmative
action, government subsidies for the theatre, privatization of nationalized industries, and phasing
out nuclear power plans.
The results were quite striking. There was the least group polarization in the de-
individuated-individual condition; group polarization was greatest in the de-individuated/group
immersion condition, when group members met relatively anonymously and when group identity
was emphasized. Interestingly, there was no significant difference in polarization between the
two individuated conditions (with and without emphasis on group immersion). From this
experiment, it is reasonable to speculate that polarization is most likely to occur, and to be most
extreme, under circumstances in which group membership is made salient and people have a
high degree of anonymity. There is obviously a potential lesson here about the effects of group
deliberation on the Internet,
78 a point to which I will return.
These remarks suggest some general, common-sensical conclusions about how and when
group discussion will move predeliberation opinions. Views based on a great deal of thought are
least likely to shift; depolarization can occur with equal subgroups tending in opposite directions;
groups will usually shift in the direction of an accurate factual judgment where one or more
members knows the truth; where views are not firmly held, but where there is an initial
predisposition, group polarization is the general rule. Undoubtedly generalizations of this sort
bear on shifts in individual views among many deliberating bodies.
B.  Iterated “Polarization Games”?
The logic of group polarization suggests that if participants engage in repeated
discussions – if, for example, they meet each month, express views, and take votes – there should
be repeated shifts toward, and past, the defined pole. Thus, for example, if a group of people is
thinking about genetic engineering of food, or the minimum wage, or the World Trade
Organization the consequence of their discussions, over time, should be to lead in quite extreme
directions. In these iterated “polarization games,” deliberation over time should produce a
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situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of any individual member
before the series of deliberations began.
This is only a thought experiment; there appears to be no study of such iterated
polarization games. But the hypothesized outcome is less fanciful than it might seem. In the jury
study referred to above, deliberating groups frequently came up with punishment ratings, and
with dollar awards, as high as or even higher than that of any individual, pre-deliberation.
79 And
it is not difficult to think of real-world groups in which the consequence of deliberation, over
time, appears to be to shift both groups and individuals to positions that early on, they could not
possibly have accepted.
80 Iterated polarization games seem to be an important real-world
phenomenon. But this raises two questions: Why and when do groups stop polarizing? Why and
when do they end up at a certain point, or even shift in the opposite direction? Nothing in the
literature on group polarization adequately answers these questions.
81 But it is possible to
speculate that polarization often ends or reverses as a result of some external shock – as, for
example, when new members add new arguments, or when the simple self-interest of political
leaders produces a shift in direction,
82 or when new circumstances, of fact or value, alter the
perspectives and incentives of group members. Social cascades often change direction as a result
of such external shocks, as through the release of new information
83; the same processes seem to
terminate or to reverse group polarization.
C. A Wrinkle: “Rhetorical Asymmetry”
Interestingly – and in a noteworthy qualification of the general literature on group
polarization – the previously discussed study of punitive damage awards by juries found a
striking pattern for dollar awards.
84 For any dollar award above zero, the general effect of
deliberation was to increase awards above those of the median voter. Dollar awards did not
simply polarize; while higher awards increased dramatically, as compared to the median of
predeliberation votes, low awards increased as well. Why is this?
Both the original experiment and a follow-up experiment suggest that this result is a
product of a “rhetorical asymmetry” that favors, other things being equal and in any contest, the
person or persons urging higher awards. Thus the fact of systematic increases in dollar awards in
strongly suggested of a general tendency toward upward movement; a subsequent experiment,
limited to University of Chicago law students, confirmed this effect, with a substantial majority
of subjects agreeing that it was easier, other things being equal, to argue for higher awards than
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for lower ones.
85 In our culture, and in light of existing norms, the person favoring the higher
amount for punitive damages appears likely to be more convincing than the person favoring the
lower amount. It is important to emphasize that this asymmetry operates independently of any
facts about the individual case. The reason appears to be that with respect to dollar awards
involving a corporate defendant, stronger arguments – “we need to deter this kind of conduct,”
“we need to send a powerful signal,” “we need to attract their attention” – tend to have
comparatively greater weight.
Undoubtedly there are many other contexts containing rhetorical asymmetry, and
undoubtedly the asymmetry can affect outcomes, as it did in the jury study. A great deal of
empirical work remains to be done on this question; too little is known to say why and when
such an asymmetry is at work. Existing cultural norms are the underlying source of any
rhetorical asymmetry, and such norms vary over space and time, producing shifts in rhetorical
asymmetry. In any case it is not difficult to generate possible examples. Legislative judgments
about criminal punishment may, for example, involve an asymmetry of exactly this kind. In
certain settings, those favoring lower taxes, or more aid for scholarship students, or greater
funding for environmental protection may have a similar rhetorical advantage. Much remains to
be explored. For present purposes the point is that group polarization may be aggravated or
attenuated if one or another side has a systematic advantage in rhetoric. Perhaps the most striking
implication is that when there is an initial distribution of views in a certain direction, and when a
more extreme movement in that direction has a rhetorical advantage, quite extreme shifts can be
expected.
86
D. Is Group Polarization Rational?
In both economics and law, a great deal of attention has recently been paid to the
question whether human beings are “rational,” or “quasi-rational,” or subject to irrationality.
87
There is an obvious question whether the phenomenon of group polarization raises doubts about
rational actor models in economics or law. The answer is that for the most part, individual
behavior within groups, as described thus far, creates no such doubts. It is certainly rational to
make assessments on the basis of arguments offered; if the most numerous and convincing
arguments seem to justify a shift, individual shifts are entirely rational.
88 More difficult questions
might seem to be raised by “social influence” accounts of group polarization. But it is certainly
rational for people to care about their reputations. If they are changing their assessment because
of reputational considerations, what must be said is that maintaining a certain reputation is part
of what people care about (and there is nothing irrational about that). If people shift not for
reputational reasons but because of a certain self-conception – if, for example, they think of
themselves as people who are bold, or committed to a strong national defense, or left of center on
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issues of race – a change in position, after exposure to the views of others, also seems entirely
rational.
The problem with group polarization is not that people subject to it suffer from some
cognitive or motivational defect. The problem is instead that people may be shifted, as a result of
entirely rational processes, in the direction of factual, legal, or moral mistakes.
E. The Relativity of Polarization and Polarization Framing
Notwithstanding the rationality of those subject to polarization, it should be emphasized
that in laboratory studies, polarization occurs in terms of a specified issue and a specified scale.
The issue for exploration is therefore framed in a certain way, and here there is a potential for
manipulation. The same group of individuals, for example, might be inclined to be supportive of
greater employment opportunities for women and also inclined to be skeptical about “feminism”;
and polarization could drive otherwise identical groups toward more extreme positions on both
questions, so much so that, in theory, one group could become very strongly committed to
women’s employment opportunities that it embraced feminism, whereas another group could
become so skeptical of feminism that it raised questions about greater employment opportunities
for women. Here there is a lesson about the pervasive importance of “framing” in generating
positions about disputed questions.
89 But there is a twist on the conventional view: In the
presence of polarization, questions can be framed in such a way as to shift groups, and
individuals who constitute them, in distinctive and even inconsistent directions.
Now if people attempt to square their various judgments with one another, in an attempt
to reach reflective equilibrium,
90 inconsistent shifts are less likely, and people ought to be less
vulnerable to framing effects. In the real world, however, it is likely that polarization occurs
around issues as socially framed; cultural movements of various sorts – toward greater ethnic
identification, in favor of stronger national defense, on behalf of taxpayer support for the arts –
are a likely consequence. Undoubtedly political entrepreneurs, with self-interested or altruistic
agendas, are in some sense aware of this fact, and attempt to produce shifts along the scale that
has been made salient.
V. Implications and Illustrations
A. Outside the Laboratory
Group polarization should have a large effect on any deliberating group or institution; its
effects are hardly limited to the laboratory. Religious organizations tend, for example, to
strengthen group members’ religious convictions, simply by virtue of the fact that like-minded
people are talking to one another.
91 Indeed religious groups amplify the religious impulse,
especially if group members are insulated from other groups; the result can be to lead people in
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quite bizarre directions.
92  Survey evidence shows that dramatic social events, like the
assassination of Martin Luther King and civil rights disturbances, tend to polarize attitudes, with
both positive and negative attitudes increasing within demographic groups.
93 A similar process
can harden attitudes toward outsiders and social change; thus proposals “for establishment of a
halfway house or a correctional facility have typically elicited private apprehensions which, after
discussion, become polarized into overt paranoia and hostility.”
94
B. Outgroups
Group polarization has particular implications for insulated “outgroups.” Recall that
polarization increases when the deliberating group is able to define itself by contrast to some
other contrasting group
95; outgroups are in this position – of self-contrast to others – by
definition. Excluded by choice or coercion from discussion with others, such groups may
become polarized in quite extreme directions, often for no better reason than group polarization.
Extremism on the part of such groups (not excluding murders and suicides) is a possible result,
96
especially if we consider the fact that extreme groups show comparatively greater polarization.
97
There is also likely to be some rhetorical asymmetry within such groups, so that arguments in a
certain directions have the automatic upper hand. Consider, for example, a group of people who
tend to believe that academic freedom is threatened by the tendency to “political correctness” in
university life; in a debate about how much attention should be paid to (say) gender studies in the
curriculum, skeptics are likely to have the upper hand.
The tendency toward polarization among outgroups raises some doubts about the idea
that certain group discussion produce “consciousness raising.” It is possible, at least, that the
consequence of discussion is not to raise consciousness (an ambiguous term to be sure), but to
produce group polarization in one direction or another -- and at the same time to increase
confidence in the position that has newly emerged.
98 This does not mean that consciousness is
never raised; undoubtedly group discussion can identify and clarify problems that were
previously repressed, or understood as an individual rather than social product. But nothing of
this sort is established by the mere fact that views have changed and coalesced, and are held,
post-discussion, with a high degree of confidence.
99
C. Feuds,  Ethnic and International Strife, and War
Some of the relevant processes are at work in feuds of all kinds; one of the characteristic
features of feuds is that the feuding groups tend to talk only to one another, fueling and
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amplifying their outrage, and solidifying their impression of the relevant events.
100 Informational
and reputational forces are very much at work here, producing cascade effects, and group
polarization sometimes leads members to increasingly extreme positions. It is not too much of a
leap to suggest that these effects are also present within ethnic groups and even nations,
notwithstanding the obvious fact that here there is a high degree of heterogeneity, and
deliberation cannot occur among all members at the same time.
Timur Kuran, for example, has explored the phenomenon of “ethnification.” Kuran’s
basic claim is that in many nations, including Turkey and the former Yugoslavia, ethnic strife is
not a reawakening of long-suppressed resentments, but instead a product of reputational
cascades. In this process, a failure to engage in ethnically identified activity produces
reputational sanctions, which grow in intensity over time, as increasing numbers of people join
the cascade. Hence “the fears and antagonisms that accompany high levels of ethnic activity may
be a result of ethnification rather than its root cause.”
101 Kuran does not refer to group
polarization. But an understanding of this phenomenon would much fortify his analysis, by
showing how within-group discussion (which is, under conditions of ethnification, an
increasingly large percentage of total discussion) can ensure that ethnic groups, and individual
members of ethnic groups, end up with a far stronger ethnic identification than the median
member, before discussions began. In the extreme case, the result might be war.
102 And when a
war begins, group polarization, if it operates at the national level, can help ensure continued
hostility and antagonism.
D. The Internet and Mass Deliberation
Many people have expressed concern about processes of social influence on the
Internet.
103 The general problem is said to be one of fragmentation, with certain people hearing
more and louder versions of their own preexisting commitments, thus reducing the benefits that
come from exposure to competing views and unnoticed problems.
104 But an understanding of
group polarization heightens these concerns and raises new ones. A “plausible hypothesis is that
the Internet-like setting is most likely to create a strong tendency toward group polarization when
the members of the group feel some sense of group identity.”
105 If certain people are deliberating
with many like-minded others, views will not be reinforced but instead shifted to more extreme
points. This cannot be said to be bad by itself – perhaps the increased extremism is good – but it
is certainly troublesome if diverse social groups are led, through predictable mechanisms, toward
increasingly opposing and ever more extreme views. It is likely that processes of this general sort
have threatened both peace and stability in some nations
106; while dire consequences are unlikely
in the United States, both fragmentation and violence are predictable results. As we have seen,
group polarization is intensified if people are speaking anonymously and if attention is drawn,
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through one or another means, to group membership. Many Internet discussion groups have
precisely this feature. It is therefore plausible to speculate that the Internet may be serving, for
many, as a breeding group for extremism.
Consider in this regard a study not of extremism, but of serious errors within working
groups, both face-to-face and online.
107 The purpose of the study was to see how groups might
collaborate to make personnel decisions. Resumes for three candidates, applying for a marketing
manager position, were placed before the groups; the attributes of the candidates were rigged by
the experimenters so that one applicant was best matched for the job described. Packets of
information were given to subjects, each containing only a subset of information from the
resumes, so that each group member had only part of the relevant information.  The groups
consisted of three people, some operating face-to-face, some operating on-line. Two results were
especially striking: Group polarization was common; and almost none (!) of the deliberating
groups made what was conspicuously the right choice, because they failed to share information
in a way that would permit the group to make an objective decision. In on-line groups, the level
of bias was especially high, in the sense that members tended to share positive information about
the winning candidate and negative information about the losers, while also suppressing negative
information about the winner and positive information about the losers.  These contributions
served to “reinforce the march toward group consensus rather than add complications and fuel
debate,”
108 This tendency was twice at large within the online groups.
It is much too early to offer a confident account of the consequences of group
deliberation via computer and on the Internet. But what has been said thus far should be
sufficient to show that group polarization may be especially pronounced under conditions of
anonymity, in a way that magnifies mistakes and biases. Though the study just described did not
involve political or moral issues, the results are plausibly taken to suggest that one-sidedness,
and consequently extremeness, can be heightened when communication occurs via computer.
E. Legal and Political Institutions
With respect to legal and political institutions, there is generally little direct evidence; but
it is possible to venture several points.
1. Juries. Group polarization is well-documented on juries; this is the only legal
institution for which direct evidence exists. In experimental settings, polarization has been found
in numerous settings with respect to guilt and innocence, and indeed this appears to be an
uncontradicted finding.
109 Outside of the experimental setting, we know that the predeliberation
verdict predicts the final outcome 90% of the time, in cases where juries do not hang; this
provides “powerful presumptive evidence that group polarization occurs in real juries.”
110
As noted, a more recent study of 300 deliberating juries found massive group polarization
with respect to bounded punishment scales; groups whose median pre-deliberation vote was 3 or
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less tended to generate verdicts below that of the median voter, whereas groups whose median
pre-deliberation vote was above 3 tended to generate verdicts above that of the median voter.
Indeed, many such juries ended up with verdicts as low or lower (for the low verdicts) as that of
the lowest predeliberation voter, and as high or higher (for the high verdicts) as that of the
highest predeliberation voter. I have also noted that with respect to dollars, this study did not find
group polarization, at least in any simple form; positive dollar amounts generally increased,
because of the rhetorical asymmetry referred to above. On the other hand: As compared to the
median of predeliberation judgments, dollar amounts increased far more at the high end, and this
effect is broadly consistent with the idea of group polarization.
2. Independent regulatory commissions. The twentieth century has seen the rise of a
number of “independent” regulatory commissions, including the Federal Communications
Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the National Labor Relations Board. These
commissions have attracted attention mostly because their members are immune from plenary
removal power by the President.
111 An equally striking but generally overlooked provision of the
relevant statutes requires bipartisan membership: The independent commissions must be divided
between Republicans and Democrats. A simple and undoubtedly correct explanation of this
unusual requirement is that Congress wanted to ensure that no commission would be dominated
by any single party.  But an understanding of group polarization would strengthen any such
concern on Congress’ part. An independent agency – the FCC, the NLRB, the CPSC -- that is
all-Democratic, or all-Republican, might polarize toward an extreme position, likely more
extreme than that of the median Democrat or Republican, and possibly more extreme than that of
any member standing alone. A requirement of bipartisan membership can operate as a check
against movements of this kind.
3. Multimember courts. Group polarization should also occur on multimember courts.
Notwithstanding platitudes about judicial neutrality, judges often have a great deal of latitude,
sometimes in the ultimate outcome, more often in determining the reach of their decision. If a
court consists of three or more like-minded judges, it may well end up with a relatively extreme
position, more extreme in fact than the position it would occupy if it consisted of two like-
minded individuals and one of a different orientation.
There is no direct confirmation of this general proposition. But some support comes from
an intriguing study of judicial behavior on the D.C. Circuit.
112 Under Chevron v. NRDC,
113 courts
are supposed to uphold agency interpretations of law so long as the interpretations are
“reasonable.” When do courts obey this stricture? The study strongly suggests that group
polarization plays a role. The most important finding is a dramatic difference, on the United
States court of appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, between politically diverse panels
(with judges appointed by Presidents of more than one party) and “unified” panels (with judges
appointed by Presidents of only one party). On divided panels in which a majority of the court
might be expected, on broadly speaking political grounds, to be hostile to the agency, the court
                                                
111 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig and Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum L Rev 1
(1994).
112 See Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine, 107 Yale LJ 2155
(1998).
113 See US (1984)25 The Law of Group Polarization
deferred to the agency 62% of the time. But on unified panels in which the court might be
expected to be hostile to the agency, the court upheld the agency interpretation only 33% of the
time. Note that this was the only asymmetry in the data; when courts were expected to uphold the
agency’s decision on political controls, they did so over 70% of the time, whether unified (71%
of the time) or divided (86% of the time). There is no smoking gun here, but it seems reasonable
to speculate that the seemingly bizarre result – a mere 33% validation rate in cases in which the
panel was unified – reflects a process of group polarization. A group of like-minded judges may
well take the relatively unusual step of rejecting an agency interpretation, whereas as a divided
panel, with a check on any tendency toward extreme outcomes, is more likely to take the
conventional route.
4. Legislatures. Legislators are likely to be susceptible to group polarization, partly
because of the effects of limited argument pools, perhaps above all because of social influence
(and the importance of conveying a proper signal to fellow legislators and above all
constituents). Imagine, for example, that a group of Republicans and a group of Democrats are
thinking about how to vote on a proposed law – perhaps involving military spending, or an
increase in the minimum wage, or mandatory parental leave legislation, or greater environmental
protection. If Republicans are speaking mostly with Republicans, and if Democrats are speaking
mostly with Democrats, we should expect a hardening of views toward the more extreme points.
Undoubtedly this is part (certainly not all) of the explanation of party-line voting. And it is easy
to imagine similar effects on Congress as a whole.
A result of  this general kind has been documented with the original passage of the Clean
Air Act.
114 In the relevant period, there was a great deal of electoral pressure to enact some kind
of clean air legislation. Both President Nixon and Senator Muskie attempted to signal to voters
that they cared a great deal about the environment. The difficulty was that both of them found
themselves in a kind of “politicians’ dilemma,” in which they had to urge more and more
aggressive regulation – more aggressive, in fact, than either of them sought – precisely in order
to maintain the preferred relative position vis-a-vis the electorate. Congress itself polarized
accordingly, toward a more extreme position than most or even all individuals would have
sought beforehand.
There are significant differences between the legislative process and the contexts in
which group polarization has been studied, above all because members of Congress are subject
to external political sanctions. Even if members are persuaded that a certain course of action
makes best sense, they may vote otherwise, simply because of what their constituents want.
Hence a limited argument pool, for members of a particular party, may matter much less than a
clear signal from people back home. This point may explain occasional defections on both sides;
certainly it explains why some members are able to resist both party pressures and the logic of
group polarization. Unambiguous electoral signals can be a powerful buffer against that logic
(though the signals themselves may be a function of group polarization within the electorate).
The same point bears on the relevance of social influence. Members of the Republican
Party are likely to care a great deal what fellow Republicans think of them; but they probably
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care still more about what local voters think of them. To be sure, the two are not independent of
one another. If a certain Republican seems like an outlier among Republicans generally – for
example, if he seems less sympathetic to the religious right than his colleagues – his electoral
prospects might be damaged simply by virtue of this signal. But analytically, the two are
different. Here too the votes of constituents may matter more than group deliberations (taking
members of the same party as the relevant group).
It is important to underline here the fact that the mechanisms of group polarization may
sometimes be at work with constituents as well. We can imagine a society in which Republicans
speak mostly with each other; we can imagine a society in which Democrats speak mostly with
one another too. If this is the situation, polarization should occur within political camps. We
might think that group polarization supplies one of the many factors behind the sharp split




The phenomenon of group polarization, alongside the phenomenon of social cascades,
raises severe doubts about the value of deliberation. Note here that deliberation might be
justified, as a social practice, on one of two grounds. It may be that on the question at issue, there
is a truth of the matter – a correct answer – and deliberation might be justified as the best way of
reaching it.
116 Group decisions are more likely to be right than decisions made by individuals.
Alternatively, we might favor deliberation for the opposite reason; doubting whether there is a
truth of the matter, a society might seek a deliberative process on the theory that this is the only
reasonable and fair way to reach a decision that will be imposed on the group.
117 Group
polarization raises no difficulty for the second sort of account; but it poses real problems for the
first. If the effect of deliberation is to move people toward a more extreme point in the direction
of their original tendency, why is it anything to celebrate? Nor do the mechanisms provide much
reason for confidence. If people are shifting their position in order to maintain their reputation
and self-conception, is there any reason to think that deliberation is making things better rather
than worse? If shifts are occurring as a result of partial and frequently skewed argument pools,
the results of deliberative judgments may be far worse than the results of simply taken the
median of predeliberation judgments.
To be sure, those who emphasize the ideals associated with deliberative democracy tend
to emphasize its preconditions, which include political equality and the goal of “reaching
understanding.”
118 In real-world deliberations, behavior is often strategic, and equality is often
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absent in one or another form. But group polarization is likely to occur even in the face of
equality and entirely conscientious efforts at reaching both truth and understanding. The
existence of a limited argument pool, strengthening the existing tendency within the group, will
operate in favor of group polarization even if no individual behaves strategically. By itself this
will produce group polarization whether or not social influence is operating. In any case social
influences need not be inconsistent with the effort to produce truth and understanding; when
people attempt to position themselves in a way that fits with their best self-conception, or their
preferred self-presentation, nothing has gone wrong, even from the standpoint of deliberation’s
most enthusiastic defenders.
119 Perhaps group polarization could be reduced or even eliminated if
we emphasized that good deliberation has full information as a precondition; but that
requirement is extremely stringent, and if there is already full information, the point of
deliberation is greatly reduced.
120 In any case the group polarization phenomenon suggests that in
real-world situations, deliberation is hardly guaranteed to increase the likelihood of arriving at
truth.
Of course we cannot say, from the mere fact of polarization, that there has been a
movement in the wrong direction. Perhaps the more extreme tendency is better; recall that group
polarization is likely to have fueled the antislavery movement and many others that deserve to
meet with widespread approval. Extremism need not be a word of opprobrium, and in any case a
group of moderates is likely, as noted, to become entrenched in its moderation by virtue of the
mechanisms discussed here. In addition, group polarization can be explained partly by reference
to the fact that people who are confident are likely to be persuasive; and it seems sensible to say
that as a statistical matter, people who are confident are more likely to be right. But when group
discussion tends to lead people to more strongly held versions of the same view with which they
began, and if social influences and limited argument pools are responsible, there is little reason
for great confidence in the effects of deliberation.
B. A Lesson
As a thought experiment, imagine a deliberating body consisting of all citizens in the
relevant group; this may mean all citizens in a community, a state, a nation, or the world. By
hypothesis, the argument pool would be very  large; it would be limited only to the extent that
the set of citizen views was also limited. Social influences would undoubtedly remain; hence
people might shift because of a desire to maintain their reputation and self-conception, by
standing in a certain relation to the rest of the group. But to the extent that deliberation revealed
to people that their private position was different, in relation to the group, from what they
thought it was, any shift would be in response to an accurate understanding of all relevant
citizens, and not a product of a skewed group sample.
This thought experiment does not suggest that the hypothesized deliberating body would
be ideal. Perhaps all citizens, presenting all individual views, would offer a skewed picture from
the normative point of view.  Perhaps weak arguments would be made and repeated and repeated
again, while good arguments would be offered infrequently. But at least a deliberating body of
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all citizens would remove some of the distortions in the group polarization experiments, where
generally like-minded people, not exposed to others, shift in large part because of that limited
exposure.
A possible conclusion would return to the need for full information, not only about facts
but also about possible options and values, and suggest that in any deliberating body, it is
important to ensure a wide mix of views, so as to ensure that a distorted argument pool does not
produce unearned or unjustified shift. For a leader of any institution, it makes sense, in any
ordinary circumstance, to try to ensure a broad array of views, simply in order to ensure against
the predictable entrenchment of private judgments. The idea of a “public sphere” can be
understood as an effort to ensure a domain in which multiple views can be heard, and can be
heard by people having multiple perspectives.
121 Thus there is reason for caution about any
institutional practice that insulates people from competing arguments.
122 Indeed, an
understanding of group polarization suggests that it would be desirable to take steps to reduce the
likelihood that panels on federal courts of appeals do not consist solely of appointees of
presidents of any single political party.
Of course any argument pool will be limited; no one has time to listen to every point of
view. But perhaps the largest lesson involves the need for caution about the effects of
deliberation within groups all or most of whose members already have an extreme tendency.
Heterogeneous groups are a far better source of good judgments. The principal qualification here
is that heterogeneity is by itself neither here nor there; the question is how to ensure appropriate
heterogeneity. For example, it would not make sense to say that in a deliberating group
attempting to think through issues of affirmative action, it is important to allow exposure to the
view that slavery was good and should be restored. The constraints of time and attention call for
limits to heterogeneity; and – a separate point -- for good deliberation to take place, some views
are properly placed off the table, simply because they are so invidious and implausible. This
point might seem to create a conundrum: To know what points of view should be represented in
any group deliberation, it is important to have a good sense of the substantive issues involved,
indeed a sufficiently good sense as to generate judgments about what points of view must be
included and excluded. But if we already know that, why should we not proceed directly to the
merits? If we already know that, before deliberation occurs, does deliberation have any point at
all?
The answer is that we often do know enough to know which views count as reasonable,
without knowing which view counts as right, and this point is sufficient to allow people to
construct deliberative processes that should correct for the most serious problems potentially
created by group deliberation. What is necessary is not to allow every view to be heard, but to
ensue that no single view is so widely heard, and reinforced, that people are unable to engage in
critical evaluation of the reasonable competitors. In this way an understanding of group
polarization provides no simple view of deliberation as a social process, but does provide an
important lesson to those interested in the construction of public spaces or a well-functioning
public sphere.
                                                
121 See Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 231-50 (1991).
122 See Lessig, supra note, at 186.29 The Law of Group Polarization
Of course the provision of diverse views does not guarantee good deliberation. Among
other things, most people are subject to “confirmatory bias,” in accordance with which exposure
to competing position will not dislodge and may even strengthen the antecedently held
position.
123 On questions of morality and fairness, and undoubtedly less as well, those who listen
to diverse opinions may well emerge from the experience with an enhanced belief in the
soundness of their original commitment.
124 But this is not a universal phenomenon, and at least
an understanding of competing views is likely to weaken the forms of fragmentation and
misunderstanding that come from deliberation among the like-minded.
C. The Deliberative Opinion Poll: A Contrast
In an interesting combination of theoretical and empirical work, James Fishkin has
pioneered the idea of a “deliberative opinion poll,” in which small groups, consisting of highly
diverse individuals, are asked to come together and to deliberate about various issues. Fishkin
finds some noteworthy shifts in individual views; but he does not find a systematic tendency
toward polarization. In England, for example, deliberation led to reduced interest in using
imprisonment as a tool for combating crime.
125 The percentage believing that “sending more
offenders to prison” is an effective way to prevent crime went down from 57% to 38%; the
percentage believing that fewer people should be sent to prison increased from 29% to 44%;
belief in the effectiveness of “stiffer sentences” was reduced from 78% to 65%.
126 Similar shifts
were shown in the direction of greater enthusiasm for procedural rights of defendants and
increased willingness to explore alternatives to prison. These are not the changes that would be
predicted by group polarization. The probable reason is that in Fishkin’s studies, participants
were presented with a set of written materials that attempted to be balanced but that would likely
move people in different directions from those that would be expected by simple group
discussion. Indeed, the very effort to produce balance should be expected to shift large majorities
into small ones, pressing both sides closer to 50% representation; and this is in fact what was
observed.
127
In other experiments with the deliberative opinion poll, shifts included a mixture of
findings, with larger percentages of individuals concluding that legal pressures should be
increased on fathers for child support (from 70% to 85%) and that welfare and health care should
be turned over to the states (from 56% to 66%).
128 Indeed, on many particular issues, the effect of
deliberation was to create an increase in the intensity with which people held their preexisting
convictions.
129 These findings are consistent with the prediction of group polarization. But this
was not a uniform pattern, and on some questions deliberation increased the percentage of people
holding a minority position (with, for example, a jump from 36% to 57% of people favoring
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policies making divorce “harder to get”).
130 Taken as a whole, a great deal of Fishkin’s data seem
to support the group polarization hypothesis; what does not is probably a product of some
combination of statistical noise, effects of external presentation, and deviations produced by
members of the particular groups involved.
Conclusion
In this essay I have attempted to discuss the phenomenon of group polarization and to
trace some of its implications for law and political theory. The basic point is that group
deliberation can create polarization of both groups and individuals.  The underlying mechanisms
have a great deal to do with skewed and limited argument pools, and with people’s desire to
maintain relative position of a certain kind (perhaps as a heuristic, perhaps for reputational
reasons, perhaps because of self-conception). Group polarization can occur on juries, within
legislatures, and on multimember courts and commissions. The phenomenon helps explain why
many groups go, quite surprisingly, in extreme directions.
In the abstract, and without knowing about the underlying substance, it is impossible to
say whether this tendency is good or bad. But the mechanisms that underlie group polarization
raise serious questions about any general enthusiasm for deliberative processes. If the argument
for deliberation is that it is likely to yield correct answers to social questions, group polarization
suggests the need for attention to the background conditions in which this is likely to be the case.
Like-minded people, engaged in discussion with one another, may lead each other in the
direction of error and falsehood, simply because of the limited argument pool and the operation
of social influences. I have suggested that the best response to this problem is to attempt to
ensure against social balkanization and fragmentation, through mechanisms providing a “public
sphere” that is used, at once, by people with competing perspectives on facts and values. If a
general public sphere is unavailable or not feasible, it becomes all the more important to ensure
that in the course of deliberation, people are exposed to a range of reasonable competing views.
Of course it might seem hard to know what counts as a reasonable competing view
without knowing what is actually right, and if we already know that, there might seem to be little
point to deliberation. But short of knowing what is right, it is possible to know something about
the range of reasonable candidates, and about who might learn from whom. Perhaps the largest
lesson provided by group polarization involves the need to structure processes of deliberation so
as to ensure that people are exposed, not to softer or louder echoes of their own voices, but to a
range of reasonable alternatives. By itself, that lesson is very far from new; but an understanding
of the potential effects of group polarization argues in favor of fresh thinking, and possible
reforms, in many contemporary institutions.
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